Selma - 06/28/02 10:12:29 EDT
Rupert, Is this possible? To more thoroughly define the desire of the big Other. This Other's desire does not exist independently of a subject.

Lucy - 06/28/02 10:11:03 EDT
That is a great line Stuart - about the neurotic not knowing "that he knows what he wants." It throws in some hope into the work of analysis. Yet on your contradictory statement over the desire of the Other... are you saying "the analyst is not the desiring Other" since he is only a semblance? He is as much a semblance for the object a, right? and where else could the object a be but in the Other?

Stuart - 06/28/02 06:27:41 EDT
The neurotic doesn't know that he knows what he wants. He supposes the analyst knows. But the analyst does not cause any desire he chooses in the analysand. He can only hold the place of the one supposed to know. The transference can be broken too soon, if the analysand doesn't recognize the desire of the Other in the analyst. The analyst is not the desiring Other, but only the object a. The analysand must be able to project the desire he doesn't know onto the analyst.

Rupert - 06/28/02 02:55:33 EDT
1. the psychotic as such lacks unconscious activity: intense language disorders..., no anchoring points..., no inscription of the paternal metaphor. So in principle the psychotic does not desire. Of course this matter is arguable and besides there are degrees in psychosis, I think, especially in Prozac America.
2. "What does the Other wants of me?" Let's drop the analyst perspective and focus instead in the engineering of the big Other, if possible...

Claudia - 06/28/02 01:39:39 EDT
Rupert - if the subject knows anything, he knows that in having a fault or a lack, the Other is desiring - wanting. The question that establishes the subject's relationhsip with the Other is, "What does the Other want of me"? The neurotic is someone that doesn't know what he wants. His transference will be structured around the idea that his analyst knows and can tell what he knows - the analyst will be thought of as the supposed subject of knowing... With the analyst the object is the lost object, the object always desired and never attained, the object that causes the subject to desire in cases where he can neve gain the satisfaction of possessing the object. Any object the subject desires will never be anything but a substitute for the object a.

Ernest - 06/28/02 00:01:21 EDT
Does a psychotic lack?

Lucy - 06/27/02 23:58:05 EDT
the lack of a lack is the real...!

Rupert - 06/27/02 22:00:12 EDT
In L'angoisse Lacan links anxiety to lack. All desire springs from lack, and anxiety appears when this lack is in itself lacking, thus "anxiety is the lack of a lack."

Terry1 - 06/27/02 15:35:05 EDT
Desire is circumscribed by lack. We all lack.

Rupert - 06/27/02 13:07:07 EDT
If I remember well, Lacan in Seminar X, L'angoisse, posits that anxiety "is not without an object," though this object is not known. Since anxiety is linked to desire (see Freud's Inhibitions, Symptoms...)and fantasy is the support of desire, we are left with the puzzle of the graph of desire. There the problem resides in defining objet a as relating anxiety to desire. If objet a is the "object-cause-of-desire" and anxiety arises when something fills the place of it, then the subject is confronted by the desire of the Other and does not know what object it (the subject) represents for that desire.
So a diagnosis of the nature of objet a will require first a closer definition of the desire of the big Other and second an attempt at the traversing of fantasy, la traversee du fantasme.

Claudia - 06/26/02 16:48:47 EDT
Bruce - about your 6 forms of castration... I don't know that Lacan talked of 6 forms of castration.
much as I know he talks of alienation, separation, frustration, castration.

Lucy - 06/25/02 20:39:21 EDT
Terry1 - is desire circumscribed to signifiers?

Terry1 - 06/25/02 15:03:42 EDT
The other is constructed with signifiers and the 'treasury' of signifiers is in the big other, object A.

Antonia - 06/25/02 01:37:48 EDT
Selma - the image in the mirror stage is misrecognized because the baby thinks it is himself. It is not himself because this image, even predating his birth, is endowed with the mother's desire. And this is how it is Other to him.

Antonia - 06/25/02 00:26:13 EDT
Dorotea - In seminar X, 62/63, Lacan connects the true sense of causality to the anxiety phenomena, for anxiety is the cause of doubt. And he proceeds to relate causality to the "objet a", now defined as "cause" of desire, and not anymore as that towards what desire is directed.
Actually Lacan is in turn speculating with the ambigüity of the term, since the cause is not only what provokes an effect, it is also what you contend for, what you cherish.
Lacan sees himself as struggling for the freudian cause - the name of the school he founded in 1980 - though in that contest you can win only when you understand the cause of the unconscious is always a lost cause.

Claudia - 06/24/02 02:15:53 EDT
Rupert - Lacan introduced a subject different from the ego. Whoever is talking - as he defined the subject - is set retroactively by the act of speech. To the extent that what is spoken rarely coincides with what the ego intends to communicate, there is a splitting between ego and subject. Eventually the subject is the subject of the unconscious. "It" (not "I") speaks in slips of the tongue and other errors showing that the ego's censorship is held up. The Other is unconscious - desire is unconscious. Not Jungian, Freudian if you want, desire that is realized in dreams is always the Other's desire.

Rupert - 06/23/02 18:30:00 EDT
Claudia - I think you are quite right in positing the Other as a place rather than as a subject, in fact it is a place and not a subject or object. However, to state that the Other is endowed with a discourse is somehow contradictory since the Other is an emptiness. The so called discourse of the Other is but the ego's investment whereby "the I who speaks is constituted in relation with the one who hears": meaning that the I is constituted as subject.
Now, the prohibition of incest would entail first an identification between unconscious and Other and secondly the inscription of the name-of-the-father in the Other. The corollary of this process being the primacy of the word: "the unconscious is structured like a language." So the Other may be viewed as a place where discourse is developed. Now as to otherness being structured by the prohibition of incest and desire only realized in dreams... sounds to me a little Jungian.
As to Lacan's 6 forms of castration, well tell me more about that or else...

Bruce - 06/23/02 10:56:25 EDT
The cause of desire is the lack we all have by being 'cut' away from the thing that made us. Can anybody outline Lacan's 6 forms of castration?

Dorotea - 06/23/02 09:17:10 EDT
Rupert again mentions the "cause" of desire. What is this CAUSE of desire? versus an object of desire. To my current understanding, the objet a is the part of the Other that is represented, that can be known for a moment, or stands in for the unknowable of the Other. And objet a is the surplus, yes, the word or object or whatever where the subject suffers over the Other that is unfathomable.

Selma - 06/23/02 09:09:19 EDT
So the misrecognized image in the mirror stage must be an other to the baby. A counterpart. But the subject finds her desire through the big Other. or through an other?

Claudia - 06/23/02 00:56:56 EDT
Rupert - Lacan defined the Other as a place rather than a subject. As well the Other scene is the place of dreams. The Other has a discourse that predates the subject's entry into the world of speaking beings - it's strucure written as the Oedipus complex. Otherness is always and irreducible outside the subject - it is alien to him. Insofar as the discourse of the Other agitates a singular subject it forms the unconscious. Otherness is structured - the principal of its structuring is the Law of the prohibtion of incest - with Freud the Law of the murdered father. Desire is realized in dreams. That desire must find expression in dreams suggests that it is a desire that the subject cannot accept as his own or cannot act upon.

Antonia - 06/23/02 00:35:31 EDT
Selma - the Other is distinguished radically from the "other", my counterpart, who resembles me and is my equal.

Rupert - 06/22/02 16:59:55 EDT
If the big Other is the place from which we (the subject) are confronted with sexuation and death, what is this big Other? Has it any relation with the eventual inscription of the paternal metaphor, that is with the anxiety that arises from castration? If so, what warrants the symbolic Father? And what means that "there is no Other of the Other?" Who can protect us from the voraciousness of mother's love? Brrr... It is interesting to note that for Lacan the objet a is the cause of desire and links it with regressive identifications in love relations, that is when the subject identifies with the object itself (no otherness?). So I think that maybe there is some confusion around objet a and the phallus...

Terry1 - 06/21/02 14:11:51 EDT
Rodical alterity or otherness, is what we cannot know, or ever know.

Selma - 06/21/02 07:58:59 EDT
I am wondering how is the alterity "radical"?

Terry1 - 06/20/02 15:08:05 EDT
Object petite(a),which floats freely, is part of the big Other, object A, which is radical alterity.

Rob - 06/20/02 00:02:41 EDT
Dorotea, I think the difference between the cause of desire and the object of desire is the petit a included in the cause of desire. But I am just guessing.

Ernest - 06/19/02 01:43:36 EDT
Alcibiades loves Socrates because Socrates possesses the agalma... There is however a detail we do not want to leave out. After Alcibiades extraordinary act of recognition, his public confession, Socrates responds with "it is not for me you have talked, you have talked for Agathon."

kara - 06/18/02 03:39:16 EDT

Bruce - 06/16/02 17:50:36 EDT
Thanks for your clarification Rupert.

Rupert - 06/16/02 06:20:48 EDT
Well, maybe Claudia is right in me going too fast, and yet... In any case it is true that Socrates refuses the position of the "object" and that somehow asserts himself as desiring...Well, not so. If in Le transfert Lacan goes from repetition to amour de transfert to deal with the analytic situation, both perspectives tackle the problem from different perspectives: how to deal with "an intersubjective relation" (or rapport). However, later on, in L'envers de la psychanalyse, he will produce the four discourses (among them the one of the analyst, but by no means the only one) and by the mid sixties he will, I think shift his attention to the most significant of intersubjective relations: il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel, there is not such thing as sexual rapport (or relationship if you prefer). So amour de transfert is amour tout court. As for "agalma," let's state that Alcibiades loves Socrates because he, Socrates, possesses that which he, Alcibiades, lacks, that is the "agalma." Now, is "agalma" the notorious objet a? Well maybe, or maybe not. For Socrates refuses this position of loved object, as Claudia says, he wants to be regarded as desiring, as lacking. Lacking what? Desiring what? And would this mean that he does not possess the "agalma"? Who knows what Socrates really has...But let's say that Alcibiades thinks that Socrates possesses what he really lacks: the "agalma," the phallus.

Doratea - 06/16/02 05:42:26 EDT
These two phrases are tangled for me: the cause of desire, the object of desire. How is it that the analyst is the cause of desire, and is this different from being the object of desire?

Bruce - 06/15/02 12:13:53 EDT
'Nothing is right or wrong but thinking makes it so' Shakespeare. Antonia what do you mean by the word agalma

Ernest - 06/15/02 02:50:27 EDT
Claudia, are you saying of the obscure hidden cause - the mother, the breast, a word... that it is bound to change and so become what, the analyst?

Antonia - 06/14/02 17:05:29 EDT
Bruce, will you ever get it right?

Bruce - 06/14/02 16:21:39 EDT
Yes I believe the term is agelma. Can anybody define it please?

Claudia - 06/13/02 21:56:28 EDT
Shall we say Rupert is going too fast?
Now the object - Socrates, the analyst - is the "overvalorized" object of the desire, but "he refuses the position of love object and asserts himself as desiring." That is, Socrates - the analyst - won't be the lover. The object Socrates - the analyst - is bound to become is the object cause of desire. And this turn of the object in the transference - an objet a - is something Lacan introduced, different from Freud for whom the cause stays unalterable. Now the fall of the object. Only at the end of the analysis the object will fall - his overvalue, that is, his supposed knowledge...which is but one of his adornments.

Rupert - 06/13/02 21:54:30 EDT
Did you per chance say "agalma"?

retentive - 06/13/02 16:57:35 EDT

Bruce - 06/13/02 16:40:08 EDT
Thank-you for this text. Can somebody please give a definition of Agelma?

Terry1 - 06/13/02 16:32:19 EDT
Yes and Alciabiades says: 'Socrates no more made love to me than I would make love to my own father'

Jack - 06/13/02 01:48:35 EDT
And it goes very far.

Jack - 06/13/02 01:36:55 EDT
Yes, of course you are absolutely right. But "fallen to the state of an object" I would not say. The object has its vissicitudes. As presence, absence, fetish, residue, remnant, remainder, obturator, logical consistency, positivation of loss . . . etc. But what you say is very good . . . so far as it goes. And your readings of _Le Transfert_ and _The Symposium_ are absolutely brilliant. Long may you run.

Rupert - 06/13/02 00:22:27 EDT
Alcibiades desires because he presumes Socrates is in possession of the agalma - the phallus as desirable. But Socrates refuses the position of loved object to assert himself as desiring. So desire never occurs between two subjects but between a subject and an overvalorized being who has fallen to the state of an object. Socrates, by shying away from Alcibiades' declaration, by refusing to mask his lack with a fetish, and by showing him Agathon as his object of desire is somehow signaling Alcibiades' futility.

dora - 06/12/02 22:27:18 EDT
You are funny, jack. thanks.

Jack - 06/12/02 21:54:45 EDT
P.S. I'm not just an "absurd pompous buffoon." And I don't even remember writing that message. I am not, despite everything, accustomed to referring to my so-called self in the third person.

Jack - 06/12/02 21:50:27 EDT
It's a very good question that, "Does love=transference." I believe that Lacan says somewhere (probably in _Encore_) that transference gives us the truth of love, without being true love. Socrates tells Alcibades (if my memory serves me well), that despite his transference with him [Socrcates] that he is actually in love with Agathon--who gives the absolutely most stupid definition of love of all the lot. Transference is the supposition of knowledge; analysis aims at dissolving the transference with the analyst, and making the analysand recognize that the subject supposed to know is him or herself. The object is supposed in the Other. Love is without an object--which isn't to say that we don't love others as if they were objects. Love is contingent--intersinthomal. Lacan answers the question of how one falls in love with the phrase: "By chance." And we certainly hope that it can last 25 years; but we hope just as fervently that analysis doesn't.

Best - 06/12/02 18:46:06 EDT

Jack - 06/12/02 09:24:30 EDT
Sorry about the homework message. I was talking to myself, I think. Best.

Dora - 06/12/02 06:18:45 EDT
I have not done my homework, I have not read Seminar 8. But still I ask does love = transference. Can transference last for 25 years?

Ernest - 06/12/02 02:03:53 EDT
Jack, I think your post from 06/05/02, is actually wonderful...

Jack - 06/11/02 23:49:48 EDT
I am an absurd, pompous buffoon.

Antonia - 06/11/02 16:50:41 EDT
so that's how you got us drunk in here...Martin Buber

Martin Buber - 06/11/02 16:03:47 EDT
I was talking about beer.

Terry1 - 06/11/02 14:54:10 EDT
The Love song of Alfred J. Prufrock

Terry1 - 06/11/02 14:53:22 EDT
Martin Buber said : 'There is only the I and the thou.....The 'IT' murders the self'

Antonia - 06/11/02 14:51:03 EDT
Is Jack scolding us?

Joseph - 06/11/02 10:24:28 EDT
To who are you referring, Jack?

Insomniac - 06/11/02 05:14:48 EDT
Hello? Anyone here?

Rupert - 06/11/02 01:41:11 EDT
True. Yet isn't a love song but a transference song? How do you manage in America to get rid of the "us versus them" rime?

Jack - 06/10/02 23:27:59 EDT
For Chrissake stop your blathering and go home and do your homework.

Ernest - 06/10/02 14:23:37 EDT
Those words are too modern for Socrates, I want to think the song Rupert is telling of is the analyst's song.

Claudia - 06/09/02 19:36:58 EDT
Tom -
Isn't Rupert telling us of Socrates song? there, in between quotations. ""To isolate oneself with another so as to teach him..."

Tom - 06/09/02 19:00:47 EDT
I gave him some thoughts on the football and a comment about the pretty girl in the restaurant opposite.
He said he felt a bit better.

Tom - 06/09/02 17:46:57 EDT
Walked past a symbolic beggar last night. "Spare some signifiers, please...."

Claudia - 06/09/02 00:08:36 EDT
Tom -
Since Socrates was already singing...

Rupert - 06/06/02 00:10:48 EDT
In The Symposium the analyst's position is identified with Socrates', while Alcibiades occupies the position of the analysand, who after Socrates will discover himself desiring. "To isolate oneself with another so as to teach him what he is lacking and, by the nature of transference, he will learn what he is lacking insofar as he loves: I am not here for his Good, but for him to love me, and for me to disappoint him."

Tom - 06/05/02 04:16:01 EDT
Is it acceptable for the analysand to sing?

Jack - 06/05/02 02:03:23 EDT
Lacan did a whole very long seminar on the transference--which is to say, love--in the late 1950's. Besides being yummy in the tummy, love is to give what you don't have to someone who doesn't want it. The gift that keeps giving and giving. Lacan has more use for love than Freud ever did. Seminar Eight, on the _Transference_, can be ordered on online from, in the French version, or Francais. But as far as I can tell, Lacan never stopped talking about love, which is precisely what one cannot talk about, but maybe sing about, which is why he is so fucking difficult, and is sometimes mistaken for poetry.

Ernest - 06/04/02 22:18:22 EDT
Dorotea - In L'envers de la psychanalyse - seminar 17 - Lacan discusses the Father of Totem and Taboo who is all love (or jouissance) and whose murder generates the love of the dead Father... And you can also read about love in Encore - seminar XX -

Antonia - 06/04/02 01:46:02 EDT
between other things what have you is the borromean knot. The name of the symptom - an imaginary spell - will tie up the symbolic to the real of the symptom...

Doratea - 06/04/02 01:19:15 EDT
Are there any sections of Lacan's seminars, or even in Ecrits, where we can read about love?

Claudia - 06/03/02 16:29:33 EDT
" conjunction with the name of the symptom and what have you." Antonia,
what is "what have you?"

Antonia - 06/01/02 12:44:53 EDT
With Lacan there is the famous cynic turn, at the end of analysis, in conjunction with the name of the symptom and what have you.

confused - 05/31/02 19:14:21 EDT
Hi, I have only just discovered Lacan and am confused as where to begin. Any suggestions on elementary readings to put me in the picture? Please email me at many thanks

Jack - 05/31/02 02:28:43 EDT
Cynics and skeptics. I used to be a cynic, in the classical sense. I believe Lacan says something somewhere about us never really knowing what the skeptics were about. A scholar of Socratic and pre-socratic philosophy once told me that the most venerable skeptics were so distrusting of human knowledge that they gave up talking. No wonder we don't know what they were about. Perhaps it goes without saying that they gave up writing. But cynics bark. I don't think that I am a skeptic, just a disaffected cynic.

Tom - 05/30/02 14:23:53 EDT
Apologies for that rather cynical last post, Hendrik.

perfume - 05/30/02 13:08:33 EDT
Someone by the name of Hendrik Speck <, just wrote from The EGS.
So you could contact him if you want.

Tom - 05/29/02 17:48:54 EDT
Well, that's spooky - I have just applied for a job in Geneva. The EGS does seem a touch ... commercial ... as though some businessman sat down and designed the dream summer school vac for wide-eyed Americans. (Lynch. DJ Spooky. Our own Tracey Emin.) Note that the stars only actually "teach" there for one week in the year.
But I know nothing of it beyond its web-site.

John - 05/28/02 14:21:20 EDT
Anyone checked the European Graduate School?
website at:
faculty looks really impressive, has anyone any experience or connections with them? im thinking about applying ...

Terry1 - 05/27/02 18:31:48 EDT
Desire always returns to the body from whence it came. It circles and returns to the body never having acheived its goal. The desire is to be complete......

Antonia - 05/27/02 18:03:18 EDT
wish Jack would tell us of his skeptical lacanism...

perfume - 05/24/02 23:19:59 EDT
Thank you Terry 1 for your nice compliments...
and let me tell you, it's "us" to make this site the best on the internet much as "us" includes you and our friend writers in the messageboard

Terry1 - 05/24/02 18:33:31 EDT
Perfume makes this site the best on the Internet.

Almir - 05/24/02 13:27:32 EDT
This site is very interesting.

Ernest - 05/23/02 22:59:34 EDT
Jack is a skeptical lacanian...

Terry1 - 05/23/02 18:34:29 EDT
Jack has it exactly.

Jack - 05/23/02 00:08:11 EDT
OOps. that was me again--Jack.

- 05/23/02 00:04:19 EDT
Drive is a montage circling around a hole: it describes a rim--anus, vagina, tip of the penis, rheum of the eye. Of course its surprising when we drop that hoop, speaking beings that we are. The drive is demand cut from a subject, or visa-versa. Desire is the subject _qua_ cut from an object. Demand drives desire; and although the apple's got no core, that doesn't stop desire from circling around it, or us, at the rims in question, enjoying merely circulating.

Antonia - 05/22/02 21:08:01 EDT
so much silence after Jack's sceptical heaven... Anyway what strikes me equivocal is "desire aiming at a limit that I don't think any of us really wants to get to get to."
AS I see it desire that aims at a limit is demand - you want a certain thing, whether to have it or to happen to you. Yet desire, pure desire, provided it has has found its way throughout neurosis or what have you, is by no means other than a surprise... more in the look of a question or so...

Jack - 05/16/02 03:15:50 EDT
this seems to empty into the question of boredom in heaven. Do we really desire to be one? Or to be desired? the hysteric's question, am I man or a woman, and what is a woman anyway, admits of no satisfactory answer. The one is the number of the impossible--its not even a number, really. the impossible is the real, and the real is hell, not heaven. "Do not accept what I offer because it is not it." Aristophanes was a clown. Desire is serious, a series aiming at a limit that I don't think any of us really wants to get to. to assume one's desire is to assume dissatisfaction. The gods (plural)are in the real; monotheism, as Lacan says in Sem. VIII, is a movement toward atheism.

Terry1 - 05/15/02 18:30:43 EDT
You have the story right Wynship. So we desire completeness.

wynship again - 05/15/02 11:23:03 EDT
in the symposium, the story goes that there were originally men, women, and a third sex with four arms, four legs, and both sets of genitals. The gods thought the last were two powerful, so they split them into men and women halves, which would then long for reunion. The original men and women, however, did not desire the opposite sex, only their own.

Cathy - 05/14/02 05:00:12 EDT
Aristophanes' idea of love is that you find your other half. For some, they would join with a member of the opposite sex. For one man, it might be another man, for some woman, it might be another woman. If a woman finds her other half with another woman, and neither woman "exists", that would not make for a particularly "fat man."

Ernest - 05/14/02 02:06:42 EDT
Violet - the "fat man" of Aristophanes, a model of completeness, joins up a man and and an existing woman...

Violet - 05/10/02 14:07:31 EDT
Terry1... in your completeness will you be a man and a "non-existent" woman at the same time?

Shane - 05/10/02 11:53:05 EDT
I was talking with someone the other day about objective and subjective reality. We were looking (don't need "at") and touching a water jug, then we closed our eyes, putting our hands in our pockets. How much does the realization of the water jug depend on the senses? How much does the realization depend on language?

Shane - 05/10/02 11:45:08 EDT
When Lacan refers to Poe's Purloined letter and claims that the repitition of the language surrounding the letter is reliant on the unconscious, is he saying that "all things" are possible because of the unconscious?

Ernest - 05/10/02 04:18:10 EDT
Tom, I say you were certainly mistaken when you thought you were the certain self ... to be you are better off lacking in being

Violet - 05/10/02 04:03:42 EDT
with the psychotic there is a hole in the symbolic fabric, right? and this is forever the same hole to evince foreclosure - the name of the father etc. with the neurotic the actual hole( )arises each time following the event (speech act...) that makes for the uncs. to be called upon

Tom - 05/09/02 18:27:58 EDT
Or, perhaps, succeeded only too well.

Tom - 05/09/02 18:22:11 EDT
Hence psychosis - the realisation that one has failed in the attempt to become one( )self.

Tom - 05/09/02 17:54:42 EDT
If I fail to become what I am, does that mean I was mistaken in thinking I was me in the first place?

Terry1 - 05/09/02 16:36:18 EDT
In desire we have no choice..........I my life is a become what I was meant to Spinoza said

- 05/08/02 19:04:08 EDT
does it mean you don't want the desire Terry1?

Terry1 - 05/07/02 17:39:12 EDT
I want what I cannot have or be...........completeness.

Violet - 05/07/02 00:03:37 EDT
free tickets to Germany.

Catarsis - 05/06/02 13:04:17 EDT
What do you want?

Violet - 05/05/02 22:09:58 EDT
Catarsis in the messageboard..........!?

Tom - 05/05/02 16:48:46 EDT

Bonni Brooke - 05/03/02 19:20:32 EDT
A necessary anguish seperates us with a desire to be one

deliriant mutant - 05/01/02 22:33:33 EDT
On a cliff
A rebirth
Tightrope walker
Wrapped in wire fence

Sprinkling blood over the dead black flowers
The tighs of justice want another bite of raw human
The twerps of destiny serve the meat upon a tray
And now they are so distressed
Everything just dies in pigsty
Holy treasons survives in pigsty

Bonni Brooke - 05/01/02 13:28:37 EDT
We is you and I not one. But we derive our image in the mirror of the other, you for me. Without a you I am not even if this you is only me in the mirror. So we implies an impossible situation which is the wholeness which it [we] can never be. We is radically broken.

Antonia - 05/01/02 11:04:12 EDT
how is we a broken word Bonni?

Bonni Brooke - 05/01/02 09:14:30 EDT
We is a brokin word.

Ernest - 04/30/02 21:05:45 EDT
for now there's more than one, Violet - unless your are a clone.

Violet - 04/30/02 18:32:50 EDT
Still, what I find interesting with regard to "we" is the split it remits to - there's more than one making for what "language made of me," even before I brake my word. A royal "we."

FBC - 04/29/02 15:37:22 EDT
I think "we" are the words which language makes us. To break my word is to fail what is created through me. The ethical problem created by the broken word is that when I break my word, the break demands an explaination/justification, a response to guilt. This response can only take the form of more words. If words speak us then they are the we, we are the they, which commands out broken word, the command, thou shalt multiply thy words. Language is the drive and words are its partial drives toward what, more words. This is true whether our word is broken or kept. In the latter case, like the satisfection of a specific need which does nothing to end desire, so with a kept word, if it is kept the space opens once more for a new utterance.

Violet - 04/28/02 21:55:27 EDT
Who is "we" in command of my broken word?

Bonni Brooke - 04/28/02 17:59:12 EDT
We word the break and when we lie another break where words apply.
We can't help it, the word lies us.

FBC - 04/28/02 17:55:39 EDT
The transgression is necessary, the law contingent.
Terry1 - 04/27/02 12:39:29 EDT
Does the word break us........when the letter always arrives?. Are we beaten by the letter?

Terry1 - 04/27/02 12:34:19 EDT
Can you break a word?

Terry1 - 04/27/02 12:33:49 EDT
How can you break a word?

Tom - 04/27/02 08:43:54 EDT
Which came first, the law or the transgression?

Violet - 04/27/02 01:22:31 EDT
including your word, maybe?

Antonia - 04/27/02 01:15:02 EDT
including rules, perchance·

Tom - 04/26/02 21:03:59 EDT
Including laws, perhaps...

Terry1 - 04/26/02 18:03:59 EDT
To break an egg. We have to always break something to make something.

- 04/26/02 18:03:13 EDT
To break an egg..........We have to always break something to make something.

antonia - 04/25/02 15:31:40 EDT
The nigger gets to exist in John Lennon‚s song

Bonni Brooke - 04/24/02 17:22:08 EDT
The nigger doesn't exist?

Sorry, no specific reference but you might start by looking up the concept in Evans's excellent Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Analysis.

Kaylee - 04/24/02 07:45:48 EDT
Hi guys and gals I wonder if you might be able to help me out, I'm doing my dissertation right now and it has to be in very soon (stress), and shamefully my uni library seems to have no information at all on Lacan's theory of l'hommlette. Any ideas or resources? I'm sorry to break up your discussion. Thanks!!!

Antonia - 04/24/02 02:43:38 EDT
"Woman is the nigger of the world," John Lennon

Bonni Brooke - 04/23/02 13:21:28 EDT
What is woman?

paul - 04/23/02 11:18:03 EDT

Ernest - 04/23/02 00:49:14 EDT
what stands for the real? Woman, of course

Meg - 04/22/02 21:16:23 EDT
OK Ernest, in reference to Karen's question: the real and god or the divine. what stands for the real in your answer?

FBC - 04/22/02 17:59:17 EDT
The link between the Real and God/the devine (the sacred in Bataille) is this. Like God, the Real obviously exists but nothing we do in an effort to substantiate its existence actually does.
I think this is a difficult subject for Lacanians because the foreclusure of the Real prohibits them from making any thing like a decisively statement about it (a kind of via negative) and for people trying to grasp Lacan's thought as an example of the "obscurantisim" which Lacan is sometimes accused of. Look at it this way, the body exists, there can be no doubt about this, it is Real. Yet, nothing the body does in an effort to prove its own exists, from evolutionary biology to cosmology, in fact does so.

Ernest - 04/19/02 20:39:28 EDT
"And why not interpret one face of the Other, the God face, as based on feminine jouissance?"
from Encore - seminar XX, chapter VI: God and Woman's jouissance

Karen - 04/19/02 15:02:04 EDT
HI, I am a grad student in Comparative Literature. My supervisor believes she noted (many years ago) a link between "the real" and either god or "the divine" in Lacan. She most likely was reading in the French. Can anyone help me with this, either by a direct quote (she thinks it was quite clear), or with suggestive allusions?
Many thanks, Karen

Ernest - 04/18/02 04:08:59 EDT
OK Antonia
the Other is different from the other who resembles me and is my equal

Antonia - 04/18/02 04:00:39 EDT
I know this may sound very simple, but what if we try to define the Other, the subject the object...
Lacan defined the Other as a place, rather than a subject...
the Other is structured - by the Law of the prohibition of incest
desire is realized in the dream, and it is always the Other's desire
the subject arises in the Other
the subject - whoever is speaking - is determined retroactively by the act of speech
there is a splitting between ego and subject of the unconscious
the object is the lost object - an object a

Jack - 04/17/02 01:20:21 EDT
In a simple way? Jaysus, I shouldn't have fallen into that trap. From reading your missage, I get the sense that you are confusing big Other with the little other. The Other of Lacan is the Other of unconscious desire; I get the sense--and, believe me, I don't know what I'm talking about--that Sartre thought that the Other was just an accumulation of all those little others. The subject? it's placeless. This business about the eye and the gaze is about how this unsituated, and unsituable, unsatiable subject is situated in the fantasy. Miller has said that although Lacan said that the only guilt is giving up on one's desire, that anaylsis proceeds, and even ends, with the analysand giving up on his fantasy. But I am no doubt mis-quoting him. And that's that. Best Possible Regards,

mireille - 04/13/02 10:37:56 EDT
Thank you Jack, what you say reveals a lot of things. But there is something very particular in Lacan's gaze compared to the gaze of Sartre (the latter: the gaze is what permits permits the subject to realise that the Other is also a subject: my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of "geing seen" by the Other). Lacan separates the gaze and the act of looking, as you mentioned it: "The gaze is no longer on the side of the subject; it is the gaze of the Other. Lacab conceives an antinomic relation between the gaze and the eye: the eye which looks is that of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object, and there is no coincidence between the two.
Lacan applies the object also for not-human-beings. So can such an object have a gaze? For example I can be fascinated by an non living object: a sculpture for example. Where is the gaze of this object, the fascination comes from me?

Jack - 04/12/02 20:57:56 EDT
I think that the so-called distinction between the gaze and the look is a translation problem. Lacan's word for both is "le regard." There is however a distinction between the eye and the gaze, between seeing and gazing. ("What are you looking at?" people tend to ask, in a usually beligerent manner. The gaze is blind--it sees nothing; which is what people often reply, truthfully, when they are caught gawking. There is split between the eye, which sees in an imaginary, global fashion, organizing what it sees into a reality, and the gaze that punctures and disorients this reality. The distinction is between the scopic drive (all drives are at least "virtually" death drives)and the specular order, wherein we see ourselves seeing the so-called world as if in a mirror, paranoiacs that we are. The gaze is experienced as the uncanny sense that we are not seeing the whole picture; it is the drive closest to the real, to the impossible. That uncomfortable sense that we are being looked at is the reminder (remainder) that our realities are not whole (tout). The beligerence with which most of us respond to being gazed at has to do with how this gaze pokes a hole in our comfortable, though not necessarily healthy, realities.

mireille - 04/12/02 11:37:14 EDT
Can anyone explain in a simple way the differende Lacan make between the gaze and the look? Thanks

paul - 04/11/02 20:08:35 EDT
i desire live chat with others! if ready...please email
will to flower! paul

Jack - 04/10/02 23:12:23 EDT
Yes, complete paranoia is completely wary. But I have on the best authority that no one ever completes it. Paranoiacs are the hardest workers there are.

Charles Manson - 04/10/02 11:24:14 EDT
Perfect paranoia is perfect awareness.

Jack - 04/10/02 02:12:51 EDT
It comes from the Law-of-the-heart (Belle ame) thing in the early, Hegelian phase of Lacan's teaching. The ego (moi), something that one has, but never is _qua_ subject, is misrecognized as autonomous, as having nothing to do with the Other, or others. The romantic, Beethovanistic self-styled genius that, as Americans, we tend to suppose ourselves to be, refuses to acknowledge the otherness of its desire; it takes itself to be as Adamic, free-and-independent-soul inhabiting an at least potentially free virgin land that is invaded, alienated in by a host of cultural, identificatory predjudices. This alienation is in is in fact constitutive of the purity in question. Identification with this ego, belief that one _is_ this ego, and that one is one, is paranoia. It is a rejection of a symbolic castration that in the worst cases will return in the real as hallucination--or even in the best, where it will return as _jouissance_. In _Le Sinthome_, Lacan says that he mis-titled his thesis _Paronoia and it Relationship with the Personality_, because personality _is_ paranoia. There is nonetheless a particularity of the symptom (neurotic, psychotic, or perverse), and a singularity--the only Lacanian refuge of individuality--of the _Sinthome_. The knot of the symptom/sinthome is the placeholder of an ultimately placeless subject. But this knot makes no kind of sense whatsoever, and it certainly not what we think we are insofar as we confuse ourselves with our egos, as imaginary wholenesses. Analysis aims at once at localizing this placeholder, and enacting its fundamental porousness. Beethoven, even if he had been analyzed, would have remained Beethoven, but he might not have lost his hearing.

C - 04/08/02 02:10:26 EDT
can anyone tell me anything about how paranoia is important in the formation the ego (according to Lacan)?

Bonni Brooke - 04/07/02 20:50:04 EDT
When we can't move our jaw our hands become spastic. A siesure of sublimation. Talk

Jack - 04/07/02 03:34:47 EDT
Intereting question. If I speak, I write, If I don't speak, I don't write. But I write most when I've been speaking the most. In fact, when I have had no hope of speaking--because someone shut me up--I have written my best stuff. But then they let me speak again. Go figure. But, of course, this formula never works twice. But who the hell are "they" anyway, except you paunchy, middle aged academics, or your skinnier emulators. Or me, and you, and they, and us. (oh,yes; I've got to push the TALK button.)

Bonni Brooke - 04/04/02 13:23:07 EST
Can you speak to the difference between written and spoken language in the same way you did about cyber text and printed text?

Tom - 04/04/02 07:27:38 EST
Words are inseperable from the medium in which they live. The paper evokes the lover's body; reading a hand-written letter from a lover is a completely different experience to reading the same words on a typed letter. An on-line newspaper does not possess the same gravitas as the printed version. Words on the Internet are written in a very interesting and as yet untheorised medium, and one which seems to be expanding at a rate beyond our control.... And yet words are living things. Lacan teaches this: they exist outside of us. They have their own agenda. It is not we who speak words; words speak through us.
I find myself typing the word 'staccato'. I like the sound of it. Other people reading this may find themselves using it in the next few days. Like all other living things, it seeks to reproduce itself.

FBC - 04/02/02 16:33:49 EST
In visual pornography a fantasy of language is built around images (what that person would say to me, what I would say to them). In cyberspace there is language disenguaged from bodily images. What sort of object do we imagine these words issuing from. We were reminded a few posts back that the body does exist. Well yes so we all know, or at least imagine that these posts are inscribed by real real organisms. What does this knowledge/suspicion do for us.

Jack - 04/02/02 00:21:57 EST
Bonnie asked: "Is this because we are never certain that any one is there?" No, I'd say it's because there are all kinds of one's out there, attached in real and joissant ways--ways often lost to consciousness--to all kinds of bodies. Bodies that are not specularizable to us. One tends to get blindsided by little eruptions of jouissance coming from just about any where than from where one sees oneself seeing oneself when one posts stuff in cyberspace. I'm always left wondering what drove me to do it in the first place. Some neurotic dream of perverion, I guess. I'm out of here.

Bonni Brooke - 04/01/02 21:15:10 EST
There is a body and it is...

- 04/01/02 20:41:25 EST
women are not the organic Other-do not position us as such. And, dear Lacan there is a body-do not ignore it.

Bonni Brooke - 04/01/02 19:00:30 EST
Jack said:"There is no jouissance of the cyber-Other" Is this because we are never certain that any one is there?

wynship - 04/01/02 12:34:02 EST
mee! mee!

Jack - 03/31/02 22:53:31 EST
Failed perverts. Because although computers communicate, they don't talk. There is no jouissance of the cyber-Other of we could be the agents. We are not seen here, only gazed at in a spread-out evanescent yet punctiform fashion.

Antonia - 03/31/02 15:50:16 EST
screaming meemies in cyberspaCE

Tom - 03/30/02 08:00:40 EST
We are all hysterics in cyberspace.

FBC - 03/28/02 09:49:06 EST
Louis said:
"But is it possible, at all, to participate in tyrany? And to participate, to take part, to partake in the absence of any option? And without option, is it possible even to conceive of tyrany, as such?"
This might go to the Sartrian common place of condemnation to freedom. What we can't escape is the option itself. It is king of a paradox I think, we need the option, as you point out, to even think tyrany but tyrany seems to be some ultimate of options.
As far as political tyrany is concerned, while we may allways have the option to participate in a particular program (this is far from clear) we do not have the option to be apolitical. Like signification itself, the political process is one which makes, so to speak, a priori demands on the human (try to think of any human group with an absolute lack of politics). So while we may have the option not to choose facism we do not have an option regarding the facism of choice itself.

Tom - 03/27/02 17:26:02 EST
And your thoughts on Mr. Said's post...?
This would seem to hinge around what you mean by 'the tyranny of the signifier' here, since you're not equating participation (as I am) with the necessity of accepting symbolic castration and the consequent imposition of the symbolic law. A rather slap-happy useage of 'fascism' as well, wynship. Are you literally referring to the particularly tyrranical nature of certain signifiers (the Fuhrer, the Volk) in fascist states, or is it just your catch-all term for what isn't desirable (like the way the Nazis use the word 'democracy', the way many Americans use the word 'liberal'....)? Let's have some examples. If tyrrany entails a sadistic adherence to the letter of the law rather than the spirit, 'democracy' and 'freedom' as used by the Republican Right are starting to assume rather paradoxical connotations, after all.......
I don't think even Hitler would have dared give the order 'No transcendence'.

wynship - 03/27/02 14:41:36 EST
Tom, you amaze me. In one post, you speak of the impossibility of controlling the Other. In another, posted the very next day if these markings are to be trusted, you take it as a foregone conclusion that the tyranny of the signifier is inevitable. No, I don't agree that there is no option but such participation. One always has the option of whether or not to participate in fascism.

FBC - Signification is inevitable, yes. I do not equate the inevitability of signification with what I am calling the tyranny (or fascism) of the signifier. 2. I did not say that there is no transcendence (a descriptive statement). I said, "No transcendence" (an imperative statement). I did not even say that there was no beyond. 3. ...

Louis Armand - In the cases of both fascism and tyranny, they cannot take place without participation.

Tom again - The Lacanian Real is indeed a fantasy, and one of the absolute.

Tom - 03/27/02 13:24:14 EST
The Real certainly transcends the symbolic, and what is to be found there is, like everything else in existence, a fantasy - but a fantasy of the Absolute, not of man. Read Grof if you are interested in this.

Louis Armand - 03/27/02 09:47:37 EST
"No transcendence/beyond the signifier, you mean? Surely then you agree there is no option but to participate in its tyranny."

But is it possible, at all, to participate in tyrany? And to participate, to take part, to partake in the absence of any option? And without option, is it possible even to conceive of tyrany, as such?

FBC - 03/26/02 13:18:24 EST
1. An option is something which one could take or leave, as to the tyrany of the signifier taking or leaving isn't an option. We are always already signified and therefore participate in this tyrany in the same way we participate in the tyrany of being the fate of our parent's copulation.
2. I wonder if the statement that there is no trancendent is thought to be absolutely true, if so, does not this absoluteness make the non-existence of the trancendent itself trancendent?
3. Does the Real trancend the symbolic or is that just a fantasy?

Tom - 03/25/02 21:55:16 EST
No transcendence/beyond the signifier, you mean? Surely then you agree there is no option but to participate in its tyranny.

Edward Said - 03/25/02 21:33:34 EST
I have read George's post below. Fuck you, George. It's not you sitting here with 16 fucking books to your name, is it? You're not the fucking radical who proposed the thesis that intellectual romanticism has distorted the West's view of the Islamic world, are you? Once again, George, fuck you.

Tom - 03/25/02 21:22:16 EST
No transcendence, Tom. The only beyond is in the phantasmagoria of your mind. I haven't got the faintest idea what that means. It sounds like one of those syntactically correct but meaningless pronouncements Lacan used to pad out his seminars with when he hadn't had any original ideas that week.

Sorry about the double posts, by the way.

wynship - 03/25/02 11:52:29 EST
No transcendence, Tom. The only beyond is in the phantasmagoria of your mind. Ironicially, it is thought that women (such as our friend Tom) are the least susceptible to this particular form of delusion.

Tom - 03/24/02 22:13:05 EST
A computer program is the staging of a phantasy, you know. Do this, do that, do that, do that, do this. If that, do this. Else, do that. Loop.
And as always, the harder man tries to control the Other, the more out of his control it becomes.

Tom - 03/24/02 22:05:34 EST
The argument seems to be that the means justify the end.

FBC - 03/24/02 19:49:04 EST
Why not kill before one is killed?
This is just what I was saying, life wants to live because it feels good not because it is good and justifies this be claiming goods-as-virtues as its cause (democracy, skeptical, intelectual). It doesn't matter a wet slap George whether someone is a democratic skeptic or not. What you fail to understand is "their" anti-democracy, anti-skepticism etc appear to them as virtues and it is we who are slaughtering them by opposing these virtues. Kill or be killed doesn't have a thing to do with virtue on either side.

Terry1 - 03/24/02 14:44:58 EST
'The function of a woman is to betray. The function of a man is to slay a dragon'

Tom - 03/22/02 17:40:55 EST
Do you mean to say that you were a man all along, wynship?

wynship - 03/22/02 12:19:17 EST
I said truth was a woman, not I.

George - 03/22/02 10:38:56 EST
I have read Edward Said's essay on America. Fuck you, Mr. Said. The idiots this country is fighting are of a non-democratic, non-skeptical, anti-intellectual, stupid lot.
To hell with your whining and your fucking Islamic brethren. They would slaughter us, so why not kill before one is killed. Again, fuck you Mr.Said.

Tom - 03/21/02 14:55:30 EST
So, if life itself (whatever that is) participates in the tyrrany of the signifier, then psychoanalysis can be held blameless for doing so?
I would have expressed myself better if I had said human life - both male and female. Although women (such as our wynship) are more aware than men that there exists more to human life than the symbolic order, it is more than they are aware of experience *above and beyond* the signifier rather than the experience of the absence of it. Life without signification entails unbearable suffering for both sexes, as one witnesses in the case of psychotics. And new-borns.

FBC - 03/21/02 13:48:01 EST
"that which presents itself to the subject as a substance is his good. Insofar as pleasure controls subjective activity, it is the good, the idea of the good, that sustains it." Yes I see the problem here. I should have said that the substance which elicits pleasure is for the subject good, not pleasure itself but the cause thereof. I don't think however that this point weakens my basic point which was simply to say that the linkage of pleasure with the good places good in an difficult position with regard to reason. That is to say that what we experience as the good bares no necessary relationship what so ever to goods in the sense of virtues. It becomes necessary at some point to link goodness to some intangable or unprovable proposition which may run contrary to the subjective experience. We are constantly being asked to give up pleasure for some good yet it is pleasure itself which inscribes the idea of good into to subject. I'm not saying that this is a bad thing but only that it seems both true and important both from the standpoint of tharapy, what ever this might mean, and from the standpoint of what we might call social policy (which might be the meta theory upon which therapy depends). It is an existential point worty of Kierkegaard and probably Neitsche, we are to some extent compelled to commit outselves to causes which seem to have no clear connection with the good as we generally experience it in its initial potency.
As to this:
"- 03/21/02 11:41:39 EST
So, if life itself (whatever that is) participates in the tyrrany of the signifier, then psychoanalysis can be held blameless for doing so? Please." Absolutely blameless or, we might say, equally worthy of blame. Everything is guilty of being. The tyrany of the signifier is the guarentor of being: "In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God and the word was God".

- 03/21/02 11:41:39 EST
So, if life itself (whatever that is) participates in the tyrrany of the signifier, then psychoanalysis can be held blameless for doing so? Please.

FBC- Your quotation says that (that which presents itself as) substance is good. It does not even imply that pleasure is that substance. How could pleasure be a substance?

FBC - 03/15/02 22:43:44 EST
?Lacan writes, around page 35 of seminar book VII:
?I would propose the following. As far as the pleasure principle is concerned, that which presents itself to the subject as a substance is his good. Insofar as pleasure controls subjective activity, it is the good, the idea of the good, that sustains it. That is why ethical thinkers have at all times not been able to avoid trying to identify these two terms, which are after all fundamentally antithetical, namely, pleasure and the good.?
So if pleasure is the substance of the good, is so due to the fact that for humans, the only meaningful criteria of the good is in its influence on our crys, (ooch or ahhh), the question of a disclosure of truth is, at best, something which must depend on a kind of training based on the prevailing social order, and therefore, to a particular discourse which is always, already there when the individual enters into to the temporal dialectic which makes him/her an individual.
This can not be directly connected to what is ?good for the body? which has to do with ?good nutrition and excercise?. The latter has to do with what keeps a particular kind of organism in good working order. Even if we suppose that there is some natural link between what is good for the body, it the sense which I have just articulated, for example, milk keeps the infant in good working order, this does not mean that the experience of pleasure which the infant derives from its initial feeding is linked to the fact that it is good for the infant?s body. The pleasure is simply the response of the body reified as the signifier ?ahhh? or what ever utterance follows on this pleasure. Any thing which elicits this response with its accompanying word will be inferred to be good. This is the root of intemporance because the pain of overeating for example is never associated with the experience of eating as such but only emerges later. We can, and do, through the excercise of reason, determine that it was likely the eating which led to the discomfort but this is always an educated guess no matter how well educated. In other words, we only ever know that something which feels good to us is in fact bad for us in an abstract way. All this to say that it is always our wish for pleasure which is the cause of our pain, at least in so far as pain which does not arise from a patently and immediately displeasurable experience (touching the hot stove). If there is any ?truth? which emerges from discovering the specific wish for pleasure which has, ostensively, led to the pain who?s source is obscure to us it is this; we can never be certain whether the pleasure we seek, in what ever form we seek it, is something which might not lead to pain. Behind this there is an even darker truth which is this, if we had such certainty this would be a long way from justifying why we ought to keep the organism in good working order. It is here that the service of goods in the form of civic duty or religious obligation enters the picture and the thing which makes Aristottle?s ethics interesting to Lacanians.
So we are always at the mercy of the signifier which arises from the effervecence of the Real and determines the image this real will assume as a link in the chain of signifiers. This is why I said that interpretation, which is, so to speak, an automatic function of being a certain kind of being, a speaking being, is the medium of the signifier?s tyrany. It is the signifier, even in its most primative form as crys and sighs, which allows the Real to turn back on itself in a determination of the good.

FBC - 03/15/02 20:26:35 EST
I think interpretation is the medium of the signifier's tyrany.

Tom - 03/14/02 21:35:30 EST
Psychoanalysis no more participates in the tyrrany of the signifier than does life itself.