You Are the Woman of the Other and I Desire You
Jacques-Alain Miller

Eve and Adam, the first “crush” in human history. We actually have data to say that there was a crush on the part of Adam at first sight, but we do not know if there was one with Eve, perhaps she had her first crush with the snake. This introduces a certain asymmetry. I give my version of the story of Adam and Eve, accepting however other possible interpretations. I have no dogmatism on the structure of Adam and Eve. Everyone knows the story of the rib from which God made a woman. It is often said that God made woman. Perhaps God had read Lacan. Besides – quoting the French version of Rachi, the great commentator of sacred texts – he says that God endows man with a woman. It is the time of the gaze. God brings Eve to Adam and Adam talks. It’s remarkable. Adam meets Eve, and talks. And see in what terms he expresses himself. I quote Rashi (a name adopted by the medieval rabbi Salomo ben Isaak of Troyes: “She is the bone of my bones, flesh of my flesh. She is called woman because she was taken from man. ” If God had read Lacan, Adam probably had not read Freud, which does not stop him describing the object choice called narcissistic: the first expression is to recognize himself in Eve, in what they have in common, the likeness between him and her. We should notice that Adam has a lead over us, the rest of men: he could not mistake Eve for his own mother.

But this advantage has perhaps one difficulty, namely to consider Eve as God the father, that is to say that He agreed to be led by her. Now, Rashi notes that, if the Bible uses the pronoun “that,” if we read “this time,” it is because Eve is not the first; she, the first woman, had rivals. For Rashi it means that Adam, our common human father, had sexual intercourse with animals, domesticated and wild, but was not satisfied with those relationships. He did not know they were contra natura. There is no reason to believe that the coupling of Adam with the animals was contra natura before the appearance of Eve. He wasn’t satisfied with that, says Rachi, until he met Eva, at which point it is assumed that Adam became satisfied. It may be said then that Eva is something else than a female. Her appearance brings about a kind of transformation of sexuality. The fact, not well known, that Adam had relations with animals gives a new emphasis on the seduction of the serpent. Interestingly, Adam’s sexuality begins with perversion. And where does Adam turn but to the Father? The woman he will have, he gets her from the Father, and it is love at first sight. It’s also interesting that she was detached from the body of man. So, Adam, upon seeing her, did not say: “I prefer the goat”, that is, with the first and so far the only, it is an object-choice. Because there were others, albeit non-human.

I will not continue with everything that is plausible on this first crush. We note that the first thing Adam is concerned with is that she possesses some familiar traits. The familiar resemblance probably conditioned the narcissistic object choice, but also affects the “anaclitic” object choice, that is, when the object choice is directed toward the mother. In this we find the themes developed by Freud in “Contributions to the Psychology of Love.” And we should mention that the nature of love as repetition is also found in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905).

The downgrading of love for Freud seems obvious when one reads what for him is the prototype, Vorbild, of any relationship, of all Liebe. The prototype of any romantic or erotic relationship – this word best conveys the meaning – is the child being fed by the mother’s breast. If this were the definition of love, we could say it represents a debasement of love. We define love as the repetition of that primary satisfaction. We can consider what is unsatisfactory in this definition if we take it as a developed definition of love. Love not only means to jouir from an object: it is to short-circuit the definition of love to define it only by the relationship between a subject lacking-in-jouissance and an object that embodies that satisfaction. Developed love needs that this object be found in a person, a person with an imaginary nature, and not only a purely objectal one. This is the ambiguity of the Freudian Liebe: on the one hand, it is love, on the other, it includes jouissance. The breast, it must be said, is not a person. There is a very funny novel by Philip Roth called The Breast, which imagines the loving relationship between a man and a breast. Literary writing allows one to speak of a breast as a person and to depict the love affair between the main character and a personalized breast. We find it also in Gogol, in “The Nose”, which narrates the meeting between a character and a nose that walks down the streets.

To customize the object or to attach more importance to the object in detriment of the person: we may surmise that in this we have found fetishism.

Glow in the Nose
It is worth thinking about Freud’s example in his 1927 article, “Fetishism,” where we find the choice of what he called a fetish. He tells us about the accidental circumstances, contingent, which led the subject to that election, which is precisely the nose. That is, what Freud calls the choice of the fetish. It is a curious fetish the one Freud takes as a paradigm. He doesn’t take the shoe nor any material thing, but something rather unsubstantial: a gloss on the nose, the Glanz auf der Nase. This depends on many things, being something infinitely fugitive: it depends on the light or the time it takes women to get some mascara. And this is the paradigmatic example Freud takes. This fetish, our objet a as the cause of desire, is openly illustrated in this example where not only it is an almost pointless thing, or a substance almost immaterial, but it also depends on a “signifier” play. As you know, the fetishist presented by Freud was educated in England, and his opening sentence was “a glance on the nose,” and because of the homophony and the misunderstanding of the translation, happens what Freud called a fetish.

This demonstrates the Lacanian thesis that the signifier structures desire. The fetish is produced by a homophony between two languages. In the example, the fetish is the nose and, according to Freud, also a displacement of the nose under the skirt. Here the Freudian fetish is a screen memory and is what Freud called a penis substitute. Not any penis, however, this nose under the skirt is a displacement, a substitute for a penis that does not exist. This is the paradox: the nose under the skirt is a bat that, in the light of day exists only as displaced; in the light of day, the nose under the skirt does not exist as such. This means that it is something that lurks in the Other, something that cannot stand the light of day, something that exists only in hiding. And when an attempt is made to see it, it is nothing other than a shine.

This is not a symptom, a fetish is not a symptom, in that it does not do any wrong. A shine on the nose is not too hard to find in a woman. The Freudian fetishists should be quite happy because it easies the way for desire. For example, one needs only from a woman that she doesn’t put powder on her nose. I don’t know if Adam wanted Eve with a shiny nose. Besides, the Freudian fetish is produced in-between two signifiers, it is the structure of the misunderstanding which produces it. All that Freud, in “Contributions to the Psychology of Love,” presents as conditions for love is also exhibited in-between two signifiers, as something that emerges in the in-between.

Mother, Whore
In the first of his “Contributions …” (“A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men” – 1910), Freud gives us the conjunction between the signification of the mother and, to say it quickly, the signification of the whore. In his second contribution (“On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” – 1912), he tells us, on the contrary, about the disjunction between the signification of the mother and that of the whore. What matters is that it is a play between two signifiers. This is a standard structure, where what takes the place of the cause, as an object, always occurs between two signifiers.

The thematic of conditioned love appears in Freud’s first text from two articulated conditions: the injured third party, and what Freud calls Dirnenhaftbarkeit, which can be translated as “the status of whore.”

The injury to the third party is the first condition emphasized by Freud in the peculiar case he presents in the first of the “Contributions …” For the subject, the Liebesbedingung, the amorous condition, is that the woman in question belongs to another man. This is articulated with the second condition that, Freud says, is secondary and is not to be found in the former: we deal here with a not very faithful woman, that is to say a woman of ill repute. Freud uses the word Dirne, which translates as “woman of ill repute,” “dissolute woman.” In Carmen, for example, this is represented, in the character of the cigarrera, through the smoke. Promiscuous women smoke and the smoke stands for the very nature of their sex lives. These are the two conditions. Freud gives an Oedipal interpretation that he builds upon the conduct of the subject in question: the overestimation of the object and the subject’s will to save the woman from wantonness. Freud, dramatically, demonstrates in the theme of salvation the equivalent of having a child. I will not comment on this since it has been widely discussed elsewhere.

I think there is another interpretation to the purely Oedipal, a more general interpretation from which the Oedipal seems particularized. This interpretation is linked to the fact that, with Adam, it is God who brings Eva to him. Here we find again the woman who belongs to the Other. And that the other man of whom Freud speaks, the third party, is not a double of the subject; quite the opposite, it is not that the subject is jealous of this man. That man is necessary – and this is capital – because he is the one rightly entitled to the woman. He is the husband who has the law on his side, so it is essential to the subject to be in an illegitimate relationship. The other man, of whom Freud doesn’t speak, is not a double of the subject but the rightful owner of the woman. So, the woman appears as a commodity, an object that belongs to that other who deserves to be called the Other, because he is not a double of the subject but someone who has the law on his side, while the woman is in the position of an asset, a commodity, the man’s property, his possession.

Here, I think, we may read a disjunction between the law and jouissance. In this configuration, the condition of access to jouissance is the lack of entitlement, to be entitled to a woman kills jouissance. The Third Book of Pantagruel deals entirely with the question of Panurge’s marriage: “I want to marry but if I marry, I will be a cuckold.” The three hundred pages of the book are devoted to this issue, which is central: to have the legal right to a woman ensures that jouissance, the jouissance of her, will be in another place. So that we can only have access to jouissance by means of the violation of the law. This has a positive side: the subject needs the interdiction of the Other, the subject needs the Other in order that the Other can show him the way to jouissance.

Already in the injured third party condition we have a ternary: the subject, the Other – barred or not – as considered from the angle of property or deception, and the object, present in the person who must have a relationship with the certain Other. To be interesting, it should be the object of the Other, it should be taken from the Other: this is what makes it worthy. And apropos of erotic life, there is a term that we find repeatedly in Freud: Wert, “value”. We must always know the value of the object, that is what the Other is willing to pay for it. In the past it was easier to know, for example, by the estimate in a certain number of camels, etc., which sanctioned the right attitude in erotic matters.

It is clear that in Freud we are not just dealing with denial, Verneinung, the question of existence, and the question of attribution; in erotic life, instead, we deal with the issue of value. Lacan developed the question of value judgments apropos of jouissance through the opposition between use value and exchange value. When Lacan develops these two categories, he finds support on the Freudian Wert. Freud himself speaks of Sexualwert, sexual prowess. And we always find in Freud the term “lessening”, which is a value term, or “overstatement”. The Freudian libido is the psychic value, from where you may think what makes for valuable.

I did a little research on the word Dirne (prostitute), used by Freud; actually it was someone working with me who did it, Franz Kaltenbeck. I assumed that this word would be found in Goethe’s Faust, and in fact I found it at a very prominent stage. This is the moment when Faust first speaks to Margaret, and says Meine schönes Fräulein (”Beautiful lady”), to which Margaret replies, “I’m not a Fraülein nor beautiful.” Later, when Mephistopheles visits her at Martha’s home, he also calls her Fräulein, and Martha says, “The gentleman takes you for a lady.” And she answers: “I’m just a poor girl…”. Those are the terms: Fräulein (lady), Blutjung (young woman). But when Margarita is absent, Faust says to Mephistopheles in a most imperative tone: “Listen, you must procure me that Dirne.” This is the use of Dirne: he calls the girl Fräulein, and to the Other he says, “You must procure me that Dirne.” There are several other examples. What is interesting about the term is that the word is used since the 16th century, and formerly it meant “public woman”, “whore”, “prostitute”.

Freud tackles the issue of Dirne as a displaced repetition of the mother, because the mother is unfaithful to the child by having an affair with the father, with the sexual partner. But this can be read differently. That alleged Dirne is being defamed – I follow Lacan – she is suffering the defamation of woman. When we say Dirne we deal with the following condition of love: the woman in question is not all for the subject; it is a version of the requirement that woman must not be all if she is to be recognized as woman.

The separation between ownership and jouissance is a separation between the order of the signifier, necessary to establish the law, and that which escapes, as jouissance, the capture by the symbolic.

It is a way of saying that, at the level of jouissance, woman escapes, she runs away. Thus, women are unfaithful, even if they are faithful. They are essentially unfaithful.

Maybe it’s an idiocy, a joke, a naiveté needed when we tell a woman: “You are my wife.” The only thing serious that you can say, and this is a generalization of what Freud introduced with the terms of the injured third party and Dirnenhaftbarkeit, is: “You are the woman of the Other, always, and I desire you because you are the woman of the Other.” Everything Freud says about love life comes together on the thematic that woman, to be acknowledged, must belong to the Other.

translated by Jorge Jauregui

11 Comments

  1. Tim Themi
    Posted October 4, 2009 at 5:32 am | Permalink

    There is nothing sexual/erotic for the infant (not ‘child’!) at the mother’s breast because a) it doesn’t know what sex/eroticism is; b) has not the cortex development to keep a memory of it; and c) it’s just hungry, wants food, and food is not sex. Freud was likely reading his own, very adult mind into the infant’s here (transference of projection, possibly jealous, paranoid). His view is like concrete in the shoes of life. It debases not just love but sex (incest! yuk!), not to mention parenthood and fine dining (analysts might keep this stuff to themselves, quarantine it, maybe see a real doctor!) People don’t just have imaginary natures, but real and actual natures, which they present in various ways, which we interpret in various ways, and choose whether to like or not. Naturally the breast is not a person, and it is more than just a part of a person, it is a part of earthly, biological nature, one of those special parts which Nietzsche describes, as always with a nobility Freud knew he could never touch, as something that is “both useful and pleasant”. Don’t worry about bad trips as repetitions. Make the cut. Decision is scission. Show me some remotely scientific evidence and I’ll consider changing my mind. Till then; what for!

  2. Geoff Royce
    Posted October 4, 2009 at 2:43 pm | Permalink

    I am concerned that the writer of this one post doesn’t seem to take into account either his actual experience with eating at whatever age he is, in that all his sense doors are involved in much the same way as any infants are with eating (try fasting for a while and see what happens to your senses and your mind) and that the experience of an infant at the mother’s breast includes for the infant such a vast breadth of sensory and emotional experience, almost completely unedited by any intellectual filters, having the unlimited gratuitous attention and engagement with the “Other”. I would suggest as a way to begin the gathering of evidence in this area, first, a viewing of Babette’s Feast and second, attempting to spend a few moments listening to the sounds some infants make while they are feeding at the breast…

  3. violet
    Posted October 5, 2009 at 12:41 am | Permalink

  4. Posted October 5, 2009 at 1:22 pm | Permalink

    Terrific! What an incredibly facile, terse and lucid exposition! Seminar XVI in a nutshell plus! And (superior adeptes de la théorie de Lacan, SVP, corrigez-moi!) this structure resembles why parents traditionally validate their parenthood by placing their sons in the military, marrying-off their daughters, and sending their infants to be mangled in school: to be able to desire them.
    Why Americans have an implicit faith in toxic vaccines and just about any brutally dysfunctional authority (of numbers, ‘experts’ or generals)?

    But I have not read the strategy for the reverse side accounted for (e.g., the right, female position of the sexuation chart, http://nosubject.com/images/thumb/7/71/Sexuation.jpg/180px-Sexuation.jpg): if you know you are represented, dictated, prescribed entirely from other Subject’s Other? Where Seminar XX leaves off?

    Is that’s the whole point? The goal of analysis? Where next year’s conference in–maybe–Geneva continues?

  5. Tim Themi
    Posted October 10, 2009 at 7:38 am | Permalink

    Dear Geoff, thank you for the concern, but I assure you, I am doing okay, even whilst bereft of the belief that the essence of our instincts, drives, desire, etc., is a mother’s tit we have a secret, “repressed” memory of. Please do not use words like “evidence” to refer to cinema, the products of some other adult’s imagination, rather than to peer review literature of neuro scientists, biologists and real psychologists who study brains and behavior according to the real and actual scientific method. And no, this does not include subjective, idiosyncratic interpretations of gapingly indeterminate data points like baby’s noises (unless, that is, they are saying something like, “wow, what a rocking set of tits I got my lips around right now, and I was hungry too, excellent, two birds with one stone; nature rules; I wish I knew how to get a boner, then I could wack off as well!) As for “Babette’s Feast”, I just saw the opening scene and that’s gross, they really overdid the sound-effects; nothing to do with Freud’s Oedipus rubbish, “Freud’s dream” as Lacan calls it in Seminar 17, in my view still being too polite, which is understandable given how much time he had already wasted on it by this stage (1969-70). But that feast just reminds me of how disgusting people are with food when they get fat, ugly, offensive to the eye, completely unrootable, an aesthetic objection to life, stupid people in physiological decline in a way that suits those too dumb to understand art, philosophy and science! Now that’s a really real concern! Lastly, when I fast, and I doubt this is just me, I think of food, not vagina or tit (or penis if you are gay); I get hungry, not horny; if it’s the opposite for you, then mate, time to got to rehab for your psycho-analysis addiction… Kind Regards, Tim.

  6. micah
    Posted October 19, 2009 at 10:25 am | Permalink

    Tim,
    on the subject of the breast being sexual or not-sexual for the infant, I thought the point for Lacan was the fact that it’s a retroactive symbolization with the resolution of the oedipal complex.

    I don’t really understand how what your saying relates to the article, other than you think psychoanalysis is wrong?

  7. Hanne Meerten
    Posted October 20, 2009 at 8:14 am | Permalink

    I like the tone in the text above. I do not know much about Lacan or even Freud. It seems nice – as a woman – to be desired from the start. And if the construction of being ‘the woman of the other’ works as a trigger for desire, than let it be so. If it is true that women who smoke are promiscuous, is a little distant from reality. But one can smell the taste of images made by men, though. So, what is the potential (potent) husband waiting for to tell the woman he desires that she will never become his legitimate wife because she might belong to some kind of ghost?

  8. Tim Themi
    Posted October 31, 2009 at 10:54 am | Permalink

    Micah says,

    “on the subject of the breast being sexual or not-sexual for the infant, I thought the point for Lacan was the fact that it’s a retroactive symbolization with the resolution of the oedipal complex.”

    “Retro-action” presumably means the breast-feeding act was sexualised in an Oedipal manner “after” the act of breast feeding.

    Now, was this by Freud? by his Theory? Implanted in others through suggestion?

    OR, was this by the infant but only once it grew up to reach puberty, when it started desiring breasts, or considering the adult desire for breasts, and in the process, happened to re-ponder its first food source? (albeit likely it can’t remember the doing the deed itself)

    And Lacan – is he saying in SXVII that because this is “Freud’s dream”, we can interpret it as Freud’s own way of eventually creating a necessary distance between himself and what rawness of drive goes on beyond the pleasure principle? of which parricidal incest is one particular path among many?

    Thus, I think my point, which I take from attempting to comprehend Lacan’s SXVII, is that the retroactive “sexual breast-feed symbolization with the resolution of the oedipal complex” story of Freud’s, is a particular truth belonging to him and maybe some others, but not all [this "knowledge" is not truth].

    What belongs to all is that we need to create a story to enable us to learn to accept our “castration”, that is, a mediated distance from the primitive rawness of the drive which would be as impossible as the real for us all to abide by.

    So Oedipus is Freud’s “story”. He’s not a real scientist. We might only follow him in learning to construct our own.

  9. Silvia D
    Posted November 27, 2009 at 11:06 pm | Permalink

    Tim dear, what’s your problem?
    do you find pain too difficult to bear?
    I wonder what secret urge makes you stumble onto this site?

  10. j. eskelinen
    Posted November 29, 2009 at 9:07 am | Permalink

    The “Freud’s dream” comment is made as a reference to the contradictions found on Freud’s different versions of the Oedipus complex, and especially regarding the conflicting status of the Father (not simply because “Freud made it all up”). Trying to read “Lacan against Freud” is quite futile, as Lacan basically spent half of his career as an educator on Freudian thought – personally I find even Seminar XX so stereotypically Freudian at parts that I just have to chuckle when reading it.

    In reference to the “cortex development” comment: if you are willing to accept the “rawness of the drives” you will also have to accept the possibility of the existence of “bodily memories” that Freud speculates on already in the beginning of his career, because Lacan’s concept of the drive has everything to do with this (the “representation process” failing in a more concrete sense being one of the main factors leading to symptom formation – correct me if I’m wrong here). When in Seminar XVII it is stated that there was S2 prior to anything like a master-signifier (S1) existing, the S2 more or less conveys the same thought. I think this is why Lacan feels the need to correct Freud’s Oedipal theory; not because he wanted simply to challenge the master. The “children having no capacity for memory” -type of soundbyte arguments aren’t even that widely accepted in the scientific community either (it’s an entirely different thing if one feels the need to reduce “scientificity” to rhetoric at every possible turn). Furthermore, “sexual” does not mean genital, it’s a reference to a larger libidinal framework in psychoanalysis. Whilst proper sexual differentation results from the oedipal conflict, it’s not really indicated anywhere in Lacan’s output that the autoerotic experiences with the mother would be mere “retroactive constructions” (granted, I don’t read him myself in French).

    I recommend reading Paul Verhaeghe’s article “Enjoyment and Impossibility” (from Reflections on Seminar XVII) and especially p. 246-257 from his On Being Normal -book. Those should clarify things a bit. Mind you, I don’t exactly understand J-A Miller’s “the fetish is not a symptom” -comment here, if it indeed develops into something that causes suffering then it is. It’s all about the subject’s own take on it, right?

  11. France S. Bacon
    Posted February 21, 2010 at 6:35 pm | Permalink

    Witness Tim rehearsing one of the oldest debates around psychoanalysis.

    If ‘Science’ is still the issue, who studies the scientists? Intersubjectivity seems to be the key to success – psychoanalysis has quite a bit to say about that too.

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